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This paper empirically examines the effectiveness of a safeguard tariff in the Japanese 
market for imported pork parts. The goals are, first, to consider a refinement to the 
traditional market-based method for evasion detection, and, second, to apply the 
method in a setting where evasion is suspected to be widespread. Utilising a within-pig 
variation in tariff burdens and the timing of safeguard invocations, I examine a panel 
of monthly wholesale prices on narrowly-defined pork products from 2001 through 
2008. The results are consistent with a hypothesis that a widespread evasion nullified 
the safeguard tariff on pork, and are robust to a range of alternative explanations 
including the adjustment of profit margins by traders. Safeguard tariffs appear to be 
a simple mechanism, but behavioural responses can undo the policy intent.
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Introduction
Tariffs are important sources of government revenue for countries with insufficient infra-
structures for collecting taxes. Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) note that sub-Saharan countries 
in Africa collect, on average, a quarter of government revenue from levies on international 
trade, and find that low-income countries have on average recovered only 30 per cent 
of revenue lost from trade liberalisation. Consequently, the evasion of custom duties had 
received considerable research attention (for example Bhagwati, 1974). Contemporary 2
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empirical research on tariff evasion builds on the previous literature but is distinct in the 
extensiveness of data analysed, in the application of recently developed statistical techniques, 
and in the careful choice of research settings.1 Particularly, studies that identify evasion 
through gaps in matched-partner trade statistics have flourished (Fisman and Wei 2005; 
Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova, 2008; Javorcik and Narciso, 2008) in the backdrop 
of the international harmonisation of the product code in the trade statistics and the avail-
ability of trade flow statistics through the United Nations’ COMTRADE database. Those 
studies have provided insights into the relationship between the evasion of tariff with the 
tax rate, degree of law enforcement, and product differentiation.
  As powerful as it may be, the price gap analysis has its limitations. First, as noted 
repeatedly, the cross-country discrepancies between trade statistics are caused by freight, 
services charges, timing of trade, product classification, among others factors. Bhagwati 
(1964) emphasises in his seminal paper that the 'price gap provides, not a conclusive proof, 
but only a strong indication of the presence of under-invoicing of imports'. The study by 
Fisman and Wei (2005) reduces this concern by focusing on the border trade between 
Hong Kong and China. Second, if goods were imported through smugglers operating 
stealthily in the night, rather than under-invoiced at official ports of entry, an approach 
based on an official statistics fails to capture the behaviour (Cooper, 1974). Last, but not 
least important, price gaps provide no information about the effects of evasion on traded 
prices — the key in understanding the welfare consequence of smuggling, according to 
theoretical studies (Bhagwati and Hansen, 1973; Pitt, 1981;Thursby, Mutti, and Thursby, 
1991; Lovely, 1994). Essentially, welfare improves if the reduction in the distortionary 
impacts of tariffs is larger than the resource wasted in conducting smuggling. Analyses of 
trade statistics are silent on the market consequence of tariff evasion.
  Cooper (1974) and Pitt (1981a,b) have suggested a market-based method for eva-
sion detection referred to as a price disparity analysis; this paper aims to refine this com-
plementary method. The price disparity analysis infers the presence of tariff evasion from 
the difference between the prevailing market price of a commodity and the counterfactual 
price that would have prevailed had there been no tariff evasion. In an early application 
in Indonesia, Cooper (1974) finds price disparities in a number of narrowly defined com-
modities during the 1950s and 1960s — a time period in which smuggling is thought to be 
pervasive — confirming the informativeness of the analysis. Cooper (1974) approximates 
the counterfactual price in a crude manner, arbitrarily assuming a uniform mark-up of 25 
per cent across a range of products. Furthermore, consider a setting where exporters have 
market power. By presuming that the price respond one-for-one to changes in tariff, as is 
often assumed to be the case, the approach erroneously attributes price disparities as due 
to the evasion of custom duties when in fact the pricing behaviour of exporters is the real 3
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cause.2 To my knowledge, the price disparity analysis has not received a contemporary 
make-over as in the price gap analysis.
  To address these concerns, this paper proposes a new approximation of the counter-
factual price, drawing from the literature, which was not well developed at the time of the 
earlier price disparity studies, on the exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT). Feenstra (1989) 
shows that the changes in tariffs and exchange rates have the same impact in an oligopoly 
market. While this result is derived under a set of assumptions, empirical studies suggest 
that an ERPT coefficient provides a first approximation of a tariff-rate pass-through (TRPT) 
coefficient (Feenstra, 1989; Winkleman and Winkleman 1998). This paper considers an 
identification strategy whereby the evasion is attributed to the difference between observed 
price levels and a theoretical benchmark based on ERPT. In the empirical public finance 
literature, behavioural responses, including commodity tax evasion, are identified through 
the deviation of the observed impacts of taxes from theoretical benchmarks (Marion and 
Muehlegger, 2008; Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2007).3 The contribution of this paper is 
to suggest a benchmark.
  The setting to apply this refined price disparity analysis is the Japanese market for 
imported pork parts. An advantage in focusing on the Japanese tariff on pork parts is that, 
due to the complexity in the tariff design, the tariff system generates 'within-pig variation' 
in tax rates. Under a variable tariff levy adopted in the market for imported pork, low-
value pork parts are taxed more heavily than high-value pork parts, creating incentives for 
smuggling low-value pork parts. Furthermore, Japan had negotiated a special agreement 
on safeguard clause in the WTO, allowing Japan to temporarily raise tariffs when import 
volume surges. The WTO records 89 cases of safeguard measures invoked over 1995 
through 2008 around the world.4 In the current setting, the invocation of the safeguards 
in the period 2001–2004 led to a 24.6 per cent increase in average import value at ports 
of entry. Thus, the institutional setting creates cross-section as well as time variations in 
tariff, providing an interesting setting to examine the performance of the price disparity 
analysis. Additionally, a focus on a specific type of commodities allows for a straightforward 
verification of the price disparity analysis with the price gap analysis.
  The topic for this paper has relevance to a policy debate in Japan. In the backdrop 
of rising pork imports, the pork tariff has generated controversy.5 While economists and 
the press generally consider the Japanese pork tariff needs to be reformed,6 the producer 
groups have managed to maintain the status quo. In May 2007, a report submitted by the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, a Japanese equivalent of the Economic Council of 
the President in the United States, argued that the complexity with tariff systems causes 
evasion, and recommended repealing the variable levy. The producer group responded 
strongly to this report.7 In the reform agenda adopted by the Japanese Cabinet in June 4
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2007, the phrase was toned down, stating that the variable levy is to be reviewed (Cabi-
net Office 2007:16). Despite this policy interest, the impacts of the variable levy on firm 
behaviour are not formally documented in academic studies.8 During a Diet Meeting 
in 2005, a politician demanded to know the effect of evasion on the price levels, and a 
representative from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries answered that it is 
undeniable that there are some effects (of tariff evasion) on the pork prices in the domestic 
markets but it is difficult to quantitatively assess the impacts.9 This paper aims to offer such 
an assessment.
  In summary, this paper examines an unbalanced panel of monthly prices of finely 
disaggregated  commodities  from  three  source  countries  traded  at  wholesale  markets 
around Japan from 2001 through 2008. Under the full compliance to the law, the tax 
hike would have led to around 12.3 to 17.2 per cent increase in traded price for a sensible 
range of TRPT parameters. In an analysis that allows for unobserved country-year specific 
cost shocks, the disparity between the observed prices and predicted prices is found to 
be statistically significant for a sample of low-value pork, suggesting a pervasive evasion. 
Alternative explanations are unlikely to account for the disparity. The results also indicate 
that the strengthening of enforcement has had a statistically significant impact on the prices 
of frozen pork. Thus, this study finds that the evasion of the variable levy have attenuated 
the impact of safeguard tariffs in the Japanese imported pork market in the early 2000s. 
This result is corroborated by the price gap analysis, which finds an evasion epidemic of 
1999–2005: An estimated the total amount of tariff evaded on Denmark frozen pork is 
293 billion yen over 1998–2007. This amount is 6 times as much as the revenue collected 
from those commodities in the period. Consequently, the result suggests that, as a result 
of the evasion, the safeguard did not result in inefficiency through interfering in the price 
mechanism, or through affecting other margins of adjustments, to the extent that would 
have arose under the full compliance.
  This paper adds to recent empirical studies on tax evasion, particularly those that 
examine the effects of enforcement on firm behaviour (Yang, 2008; Marion and Muehleg-
ger, 2008; Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova, 2008).10 The current study corroborates 
the previous findings that enforcement affects firms’ decisions to engage in tax evasion. 
One distinctive feature with this paper is in documenting a case where, due to pervasive 
evasion, prices do not respond one-for-one to changes in tariff. A number of studies point 
out that the tax incidence, while theoretically well understood, is not well documented 
empirically (Besley and Rosen, 1999; Alm, Sennoga, and Skidmore, 2009). In understand-
ing tax incidence, the economic reasoning point us to the demand elasticity and the market 
power of suppliers, but the results in this paper remind us that behavioural responses that 
operates outside the conventional price mechanism can induce first-order effects on the No. 382, 2009
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formation of market prices.11
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the pork market 
and policies in Japan. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 examines the responses of 
wholesale prices to the invocation of safeguards, considers non-evasion based explanation 
for an observed lack of price response, and presents a price gap analysis. Section 6 con-
cludes.
Background on the Japanese market for imported pork
Industry characteristics
Japan in 2008 imports about a half of domestic pork consumption from abroad, a substantial 
increase from 1990 when the import share was about a quarter.12 The major source coun-
tries are the Denmark, United States, and Canada, which have the import share in 2000 
of 32.6, 29.0, and 17 per cent respectively. Imports from neighbouring countries such as 
Taiwan and Korea are limited due to the outbreak of foot and mouse disease outbreaks 
in these countries. About 70 per cent of pork imports are frozen meat, which are inputs 
for manufacturing processed meats, such as ham and sausages. The downstream market is 
dominated by large meat processing companies: the five-firm concentration ratio in 1999 
was 56.7 per cent. The meats are imported by trading intermediaries, which are relatively 
small — there were about 60 companies importing pork in 2000. Some of the trading 
intermediaries are subsidiaries of the downstream manufacturers.
The variable levy on imported pork
The European Union used to adopt a variable import levy on some of its agricultural 
commodities (Harris, Swinbank, and Wilkinson, 1983). The Japanese tariff on pork is a 
version of the variable import levy (Obara, Dyck, and Stout, 2003). Figure 1 illustrates 
the relationship between the imported price (CIF) and after-tax price. The unit is in per 
kilo of pork parts. There are three segments: If the average price per kilo is beyond the 
gate price of 524 yen, there is an ad valorem tax of 4.3 per cent per kilo; between 524 and 
65 yen, the levy is the difference between 546.5 and CIF; below 65 yen, there is unit tax 
of 482 yen per kilo. Except for dressed carcasses for which the gate price of 393 per kilo 
applies, any pork parts are taxed under this scheme. In short, the system sets a price floor 
— officially called a standard import price — on pork parts imports.
  There are concerns about several types of behavioural responses. First, since low-
value pork parts are taxed heavily under the variable levy, there are incentives to smuggle 
low-value parts disguised as high-value parts. Given that much of the import demand is 6
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for low-value frozen pork parts for processing into ham and sausages, the incentives for 
smuggling are relevant. In light of the finding by Fisman and Wei (2005) that suggests 
higher tariff rates induce more traders to evade tariffs, it is plausible to expect that traders 
attempt to evade duties. Second, there is de facto permission for mixing different parts 
shipped from a same origin country by the same storage method. This means that traders 
can combine frozen tenderloin and belly from Denmark to increase the weighted average 
price per invoice. This mixing strategy is thought to be a common practice.13 Tanaka and 
Mori (2001) show that high-value meats from the United States are traded at discount on 
the data from 1998 through 2000, and interpret the result as suggesting that the traders 
import high-value parts for tax purposes despite smaller domestic demand for high-value 
imported pork parts. Third, according to a trader whom I interviewed, the system discour-
ages traders from claiming refund for the damaged commodities on arrival, since claiming 
damage reduces the value to be declared to the Japanese custom and thereby increases the 
amount of tax liability. Thus, this variable levy creates a variety of incentives that are not 
captured in the price mechanism.
Figure 1: Variable import levy on pork
Source: Author’s Caculations7
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The safeguard of a domestic swinery
Several changes to the price floor provide a useful setting to implement a study on price 
disparities. The WTO agreement permits Japan to invoke two types of safeguard tariffs on 
pork: gate-price safeguard (SG) and special safeguard (SSG).14 SG raises the price floor 
to 681 yen from 546.53 yen and is invoked if import surges beyond a trigger level — the 
import volume above 119 per cent of the average volume for the past three years. The 
quantity test is based on the cumulative volume since the beginning of the Japanese Fiscal 
Year (JFY), which is from April to March. Once invoked, SG lasts till the end of JFY and 
is removed from the beginning of the following JFY. The focus of this study is the SG 
invoked in 2001–2004 based on the availability of commodity price data. SSG increases 
the tariff rate to 6.5 per cent and was invoked in January–March 1997.
  Figure 2 shows the impact of the changes in gate price on the reported import per-
kilo price (CIF) from 1988 to 2008. Unlike usual time series data on prices, the pattern 
is quite unusual in tracing the gate price very closely. The solid and dotted line shows, 
respectively, the average price for invoices declared above and below the gate price. The 
proximity of two lines indicates the distribution of declared price that is dense around 
the gate price. Two lines trace the reduction in the gate price until 2000 under the WTO 
agreement, as well as the invocation of SG in JFY 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2000-2004.
Figure 2: Average declared price of frozen pork imports
Source: Author’s Caculations8
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  As the timing of the safeguard removal is known, traders are expected to adjust 
the timing of trade to take advantage of a lower tariff after safeguard removal at the end 
of March. Safeguards were invoked in 2001 after there was a surge in imports that was 
intended to beat the import restrictions from Europe due to the outbreak of the foot and 
mouth disease. Thus, hoarding behaviour is a relevant consideration in the analysis of the 
price disparity.
Law enforcement
The evasion of pork tariffs is an chronic issue since the introduction of the variable levy 
in 1974. In a recent criminal case, a meat wholesaler was accused in 2007 of evading 5.9 
billion yen over 23 month (April 2003-February 2005). Relative to 16.1 billion yen col-
lected from tariff revenue on pork in 2005, the amount from a single case was already 
substantial. A casual examination of court cases suggests that the enforcement strengthened 
during 2005.15 The total amount of tax evaded in the five large cases of criminal indict-
ments from 1999 through 2004 was 740 million yen whereas the total amount was 24.5 
billion yen for five cases from May 2005 through February 2007; for the first time since 
the enactment of the custom law, a warehouse company caught with a tariff evasion had 
its permission to conduct custom clearance services revoked in December 2006. Corre-
spondingly, a heavier penalty on tariff evasion was enacted in March 2005 and was enforced 
from October 2005. Previously, the penalty was at a maximum 5 years of imprisonment 
and/or a maximum fine of 5 million yen, in addition to a penalty from 10 per cent of the 
correct tax liability. The penalty tax was increased to 35 per cent in the reform of 2005. 
In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries nudged traders for better 
compliance through distributing a leaflet in April-May 2005. The leaflet contains texts that 
call for a better compliance and inform traders about the legislative change on penalties. 
Thus, the policy environment changed in the mid-2000s.
Data
The data source is the monthly product-level price data on pork parts published by the 
Japan Meat Trade Centre (JMTC), which organises wholesale markets for domestic as well 
as imported meats in several locations around Japan. The main advantage of the JMTC data 
over other information source on pork price is the level of disaggregation; some wholesale 
markets publicise the prices of domestic dressed carcasses and sometimes prices of meat 
parts, but the JMTC is, to my knowledge, the only data that allows us to make a distinction 
between, for example, the prices of chilled tenderloin from the United States and frozen 
belly from Denmark.16 The main trading results at JMTC are published daily in the press, 9
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including the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the Japanese-equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. 
Transactions of imported pork are, however, typically over-the-counter trades, meaning 
downstream meat processors deal directly with trading intermediaries rather than making 
purchases at wholesale markets (Kaku and Fukase 2002). In 2005, the total volume of 
imported pork traded at the JMTC was 8.2 thousand tons, which is just 0.94 per cent 
of the total imported volume of frozen and chilled pork parts declared at the custom in 
the year. An ideal data is the trade information of private parties, but the arbitrage would 
prevent a divergence of JMTC prices from trades conducted elsewhere.17 Furthermore, 
the JMTC publication is used as reference prices by transacting parties.
  I use the monthly weighted-average prices from three markets at varying time lengths: 
Kawasaki, located near Tokyo, (2001:2-2008:7), Osaka (2003:3-2008:7) and Nagoya 
(2005:3-2008:7). JMTC has provided the data in electric format from 2005 onwards, 
and I obtained photocopies of the trade archives at their business office in Kawasaki for 
the earlier data. Data contains six pork parts (back ribs, belly, butt, collar, loin, and tender 
loin), two storage methods (frozen and chilled), and three countries of origin (Canada, 
Denmark, and United States). Other sources of data used in this study are in the data ap-
pendix. Table 1 shows the summary statistics.
Table 1: Summary statistics
  Mean  S.D.  N
Frozen     
Backribs  580.6  37.7  196 
Belly  589.8  39.9  544 
Butt  577.8  43.5  90 
Collar  548.0  82.5  196 
Tender Loin  811.5  54.3  344 
       
Chilled     
Backribs  721.6  40.2  196 
Belly  749.8  27.3  252 
Butt  704.9  33.3  155 
Loin  698.4  39.0  196 
Tender Loin  936.1  73.6  351 
       
Exchange rates     
JPY/CAD  91.3  12.4  90 
JPY/DKK  18.4  2.4  90 
JPY/USD  115.6  7.3  90
Source: Author’s Caculations10
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Analyses
Visual inspection and a preliminary test
Figure 3 plots the weighted average prices of frozen pork belly, along with those of frozen 
tenderloin, imported from Denmark and traded at the Kawasaki market from 2001:2 
through 2008:7. I focus on these products in a preliminary analysis since about 70 per 
cent of pork imports in 2000 are frozen, and 46 per cent of them originate in Denmark. 
The dotted lines show the levels of price floors and the timing of SG invocations over 
August-March in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Note that the price of belly is well below 
the price floor during the safeguard, but tenderloin is traded above the price floor. Thus, 
under full compliance, we would expect the belly price to be affected by SG but not the 
tenderloin price. Recall that the declared prices on frozen pork parts changed sharply dur-
ing SG. Here, SG appears to have no effects on the market price of belly.
  To formalise this observation, I consider modeling the belly-tenderloin relationship 
in a cointegration regression.18 Since those belly and tenderloin are produced in Denmark 
and might originate from identical animals, those commodities are, in theory, subject to 
similar shocks (for example fluctuations in feed prices). Indeed, a sharp rise in 2001 for 
both commodities is caused by a contraction in supply due to the food and mouth disease 
Figure 3: Frozen pork from Denmark: Tokyo market
Source: Author’s Caculations11
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outbreak in Europe that led to a temporary suspension of Denmark import. The ban was 
lifted in one month. The pattern suggests a long-term relationship between the prices of 
these closely-related commodities. It is thus sensible to expect these prices to be co-inte-
grated. Under a full compliance to the tariff change, then, we would expect the relative 
prices of those commodities to be affected due to the differential in tax treatments of those 
goods.
  The framework for the analysis is the cointegration regression with a known structural 
break. If SG had its intended effects — to penalise cheap imports — we would expect a 
break in the cointegrating relationship between belly and tenderloin. I fit a dynamic OLS 
with a structural break following the application in Hayashi (2000). Standard tests showed 
that two series are nonstationary and are cointegrated.19
2 1 0 1 1
,0 1 , 1 1 1 , 2 1 2 ,1 1 1 ,2 1 2
t t t t t
p t p t p t p t p t t
p p D p D
p p p p p
µ γ δ δ
β β β β β υ
− + − + − −
= + + + +
∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + (1)  
 
Dt takes the value of 1 while SG is invoked (that is August to March, every JFY from 
2001 through 2004). For modeling convenience, this formulation treats all periods of 
SG as a single regime. p1t and p2t are, respectively, the price of belly and tenderloin in log. 
0 δ  and 
1 δ  are the parameter of interest since they capture changes in the cointegrating 
relationship. 
t υ  is a white noise. The lag and lead terms in a dynamic OLS regression are 
included to deal the serial correlation issue. Appropriate standard errors are calculated 
following Hayashi (2000).
  A structural change is tested with the Chow test. The null hypothesis is the safeguard 
having no effects on the cointegrating relationship ( 
0 1 0 δ δ = =  ). A non rejection of the 
null will be interpreted as a pattern consistent with the attenuation of safeguard due to a 
host of reasons that I am not distinguishing at this stage. Below, I attempt to distinguish 
alternative explanations, including the tariff evasion, adjustment of profit margins, hoarding, 
and mixing strategy. Notice that this approach presumes guilty by taking pervasive evasion 
as a maintained hypothesis. A preferred approach, to be explored below, would be to take 
no evasion as a null (Marion and Muehlegger, 2008). Table 2 presents the results. 12
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Table 2: Dynamic Ordinary Least Square Estimates
Dependent variable: LOGTLOIN, DENMARK FROZEN
    Break point   
Variables 
  Safeguard  Safeguard  2005.6
BELLY  0.064     3.025     2.135   ** 
  (0.390)    (3.989)    (0.813)   
REGIME  -11.116   +  6.327     14.516   + 
  (5.916)    (26.502)    (7.546)   
BELLY×REGIME  1.764   +  -1.000     -2.301   + 
  (0.937)    (4.204)    (1.188)   
           
WALD STATISTIC  4.193    0.142    7.049  * 
  [0.123]    [0.931]    [0.029]   
             
Sample period  01:4-08:5    01:4-05:3    01:4-08:5 
Note: Rescaled standard errors are in parentheses. P-values for the Wald statistic are in brackets. 
Source: Author's Calculations
 
  The estimate from a baseline regression (Column 1) indicates a change in the co-
integrating vector in an unexpected direction — we would expect that the belly-tenderloin 
price gap to narrow but the implied spread between two commodities becomes wide. A 
likely cause is the strengthening of enforcement. The increase in belly price in 2005 roughly 
coincides with the introduction of heavier penalty and prominent criminal cases. I have 
tried excluding the sample period after mid-2005 with a caution that the power of the test 
is likely to be low due to a small sample size (Column 2). Estimated parameters are not 
significant, and Chow test indicates a lack of structural break. I have tried a specification 
with a break point at June 2005 (Column 3). The model indicates a significant change in 
the cointegrating relationship after the mid-2005 in an expected direction. In sum, this 
preliminary analysis confirms, though with caution, the visual inspection showing the lack 
of price response to SG. Instead, the stronger enforcement appears to have affected the 
price of frozen belly imported from Denmark.
  While the finding of no structural change is consistent with the evasion of tariff, 
the attenuation may be caused by other forms of behavioural response. I examine other 
explanations below.13
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Is the lack of response due to the adjustment of the profit margin?
Exchange-rate pass-through coefficient as an approximation
The lack of price response may be due to traders bearing the tax incidence by adjusting 
profit margins in response to SG. This section considers the role of pricing behaviour 
in attenuating SG tariffs. The proposed empirical approach is in line with Marion and 
Muehlegger (2008) and Chatty, Looney, and Kroft (2007). As discussed already, in these 
studies, different types of behavioural responses are expected to weaken the response of 
some variables to taxes. To identify the behavioural response, the estimates of the tax effects 
are compared with a benchmark for which the magnitudes are theoretically equivalent in 
the absence of the particular behavioural response.20
  A benchmark considered in this paper is the degree of exchange rate pass-through 
(ERPT). Theoretical and empirical bases render ERPT coefficients a reasonable approxima-
tion for tariff rate pass-through (TRPT) coefficients. Feenstra (1989) proposes the sym-
metry of ERPT and TRPT in the following model of an exporting firm whose objective 
is to maximize an expected profit in the unit of foreign currency.
+ + (2) [ ] [ ] { } / (1 ) ( , , ) ( , ) (1 ) /
p
Max e px p q I c x w e t t − − −
 
e denotes an expected exchange rate in the unit of foreign currency per unit of home currency. 
The objective of the firm is to maximise an expected profit, but since the only stochastic 
variable in the model is the exchange rate, the model is written without the expectation 
operator. x(.) is an import demand, which is a function of the price of imported product 
(p), the price of a competing variety (q), and income level (I), all of which is denoted in 
the unit of domestic currency. c(.) is the cost function, which depends on the foreign factor 
price and quantity demanded, and is denoted in the unit of foreign currency.
  The formulation shows that the change in expected exchange rate or tariff rate can 
be represented as a cost shifter. To the extent that the changes in tariff and exchange rate 
affect the term (1+t)/e equivalently, the pricing decision does not depend on the source 
of cost shocks. Thus, the model predicts a symmetry of ERPT and TRPT.
  The symmetry hypothesis, however, requires assumptions that may not be tenable 
in various practical settings. If production costs co-vary with exchange rate (Goldberg and 
Hellerstein, 2008), which can happen when inputs include imported materials, the symme-
try prediction does not hold. Similar to the concern discussed by Marion and Muehlegger 
(2008) in the context of local diesel markets, the transition effects of tariffs and exchange 
rates are unlikely to be the identical since tariff change may be fully expected while the 14
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exchange rate movements are much uncertain. If the fluctuation of exchange rate is small 
and the producers do not make any adjustment to small changes in exchange rate due to 
menu costs, the degree of ERPT may underestimate the degree to which the producer 
respond to a large change in tariff. Despite these theoretical concerns, previous empirical 
studies find that the degree of ERPT and TRPT are not different statistically (Feenstra, 
1989; Winkleman and Winkleman 1998).21 Thus, ERPT provides a first approximation 
of the expected response of prices in absence of tariff evasion.
What is a sensible range for a TRPT coefficient?
Table 3 provides a summary of previous ERPT studies on various food categories in 
Japan. 
Table 3: ERPT estimates from closely related commodities
  Study  Category  Estimation  ERPT  Import      
      Period     share (year)
[1]  Kimura et al. (1997)  Livestock   1985-1994  0.707  0.20 (1990)   
    products 
[2]  Campa & Goldberg (2005)  Food  1975-2003  0.269  - 
[3]  Ohtani et al. (2003)   Food  1991.1-2002.10  0.59  - 
[4]  Miljkovic & Zhuang (2007)  Beef  1996.11-2006.1  0.504  0.58 (2005) 
    Pork  1996.11-2006.1  0.129  0.53 (2005) 
    Poultry  1996.11-2006.1  0.943  0.40 (2005) 
[5]  Ono (2007)   Frozen minced 2001.1-2007.6  0.657  0.64 (2002)  
    Alaskan Pollack 
    imported from US 
Notes: The frequency for the data is monthly except [1] (two periods) and [2] (quarterly). Data 
is import price indices, at varying level of disaggregation, published by the Bank of Japan except 
[1] (input-output table) and [4] (trade statistics).     
Source: Author's Calculations
 
  Overall, the ERPT estimates range from 0.129 to 0.94. Campa and Goldberg 
(2005) provide a low estimate (0.269) based on quarterly data on the Japanese food price 
index on import. Ohtani et al. (2003) replicate the Campa-Goldberg study with monthly 
data and find a larger coefficient (0.59). In an early study, Kimura et al. (1997) use the 
import price deflator for livestock products — more relevant food category — and report 
the estimate of 0.71. Miljkovic and Zhuang (2007) focus on even narrower categories: 
beef, pork, and poultry. The data source, however, is the Japanese trade statistics, where 
declared values for pork are highly susceptible to misreporting. Possibly reflecting the 
misreporting concern, the estimated ERPT coefficient for pork is the lowest among all 
estimates (0.129) and is not significantly different from zero. The estimate for beef and 15
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poultry is 0.50 and 0.94 respectively. Ohno (2007) focuses on the price of minced frozen 
Alaska Pollack, and finds an ERPT estimate of 0.66. Like frozen pork, this frozen fish 
product is mainly processed to produce traditional fish cakes. From the comparability of 
the data frequency and product category, I take a range of 0.5-0.7 as a benchmark for a 
TRPT into the pork price.
Panel data analysis
To address the issue with power, I utilise the panel data on pork-parts price series. I have 
considered the validity of a group of high-value parts as a control sample. I define low-
value parts to include all frozen parts except tenderloin (that is backribs, belly, butt, collar) 
and high-value parts to include all the chilled meats (backribs, belly, butt, loin, tenderloin) 
and frozen tenderloin. The mean price for the former and latter group is 579 and 793 
yen/kilo respectively. Given that the average price of the former is well below the price 
floor under SG, the direct impacts of SG are expected to fall on low-value meats. Initial 
examination revealed that a group of chilled products would not serve as an appropriate 
control products for a group of frozen products since the price of chilled parts appear to 
be influenced more by the outbreaks of livestock diseases, such as the bird flu outbreaks 
in 2001-2002, and the BSE concerns for domestic as well as US beef.22 These factors 
might have increased the price volatility since chilled meats are consumed directly. The 
possible change in the seasonal pattern for high-value meat raises a question about the 
appropriateness of using the group as a control in implementing a difference-in-difference 
analysis. Thus, I consider a difference estimator in this paper.
  The data is the unbalanced panel of JMTC pork price series for a category of low-
value parts described above. Exchange rates variables, in addition to the price series, are 
found to contain unit roots. Given the concern about the panel spurious regression when 
the cross-section dimension is small, I estimate the model in first difference. The following 
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  pit is the price of ith commodity in log. There are 15 series, containing 3 origin 
countries, 2 storage types, 5 parts, and 3 locations at the destination country. ek,t-m is the 
mth lag of the exchange rate between yen and the origin country currency in log. I follow 
the ERPT literature and use the spot market data. ak,t-m is a currency-specific ERPT coef-
ficient, assumed to be constant across commodities from a same origin country(k). The 
specification includes three lags.
  To flexibly model the impacts of SG invocations and removals, a preferred specifica-16
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tion includes dummy variables (sgjt) indicating jth month in a fiscal year since the invocation 
of each SG in JFY 2001, 02, 03 and 04. for example sg1,t and sg12,t is, respectively, a dummy 
variable for August 2001-04 and July 2002-05. lj is the main coefficient of interest, and is 
designed to capture the difference in price changes across months with and without SG. 
We would expect that a cumulative value of l to be positive when SG has had its intended 
effects of increasing the price of imported pork. Under the assumption that the seasonal 
trend remains the same on average, the coefficient is interpreted as the impact of the SG. 
The models are estimated with OLS with standard error clustered by each series.
  Xit is a vector of control variables: seasonality controls that allow for heterogene-
ous trend for 6 parts stored in different methods; year-country specific production cost 
control; dummies for April 2005, the month just after the enactment of the strengthened 
penalty, and two lags.
Results
Table 4 presents the analysis, progressively adding control variables. For the sample of 
low-value commodities, the coefficients on the SG dummies are generally not significantly 
different from zero, and are sensitive to the addition of controls for those that have signifi-
cant coefficients in the baseline specification, which only control for parts-storage specific 
seasonality (Column 1). A test on joint significance, to be discussed below, confirms the 
lack of explanatory power of the SG on price. The exchange rates appear to have a weak 
explanatory power in the sample of frozen commodities. In the full specification (Col-
umn4), the individual coefficients are not significant, except for the first lag of Canadian 
dollar (CAD). The sum of the coefficients are 0.125, 0.076, and 0.097 for CAD, Den-
mark Kroner (DKK), and US dollar (USD), respectively. Jointly, USD is significant but 
not CAD and DKK. The timing of the enactment of the tougher penalty law is strongly 
correlated with the price increase. The first and second lags are significant at the 5 and 1 
per cent level respectively. The three penalty law variables are jointly significant at the 1 
per cent level.17
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Table 4: The estimate of a difference model using low-value pork parts sample 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]
sg_aug  -0.0088  -0.0084  0.0028  -0.0113 
  (0.0110)  (0.0109)  (0.0159)  (0.0174) 
sg_sep  -0.0037  -0.0039  0.0075  -0.0043 
  (0.0066)  (0.0075)  (0.0081)  (0.0088) 
sg_oct  0.0006  0.0010  0.0126  0.0014 
  (0.0072)  (0.0081)  (0.0147)  (0.0167) 
sg_nov  0.0078  0.0078  0.0197*  0.0076 
  (0.0052)  (0.0053)  (0.0074)  (0.0084) 
sg_dec  -0.0112*  -0.0115*  -0.0002  -0.0128 
  (0.0041)  (0.0046)  (0.0085)  (0.0114) 
sg_jan  0.0020  0.0025  0.0131  0.0083 
  (0.0081)  (0.0083)  (0.0098)  (0.0094) 
sg_feb  -0.0338**  -0.0212*  -0.0101  -0.0166 
  (0.0074)  (0.0076)  (0.0133)  (0.0142) 
sg_mar  -0.0179**  -0.0106*  -0.0002  -0.0134 
  (0.0054)  (0.0042)  (0.0094)  (0.0142) 
sg_apr  0.0073  -0.0013  0.0097  -0.0061 
  (0.0056)  (0.0047)  (0.0088)  (0.0126) 
sg_may  0.0219**  0.0238*  0.0331*  0.0036 
  (0.0072)  (0.0086)  (0.0134)  (0.0136) 
sg_jun  0.0071  0.0059  0.0154  0.0115 
  (0.0056)  (0.0058)  (0.0108)  (0.0115) 
sg_jul  0.0062  0.0059  0.0070  0.0100 
  (0.0084)  (0.0083)  (0.0081)  (0.0082) 
L1(CAD)    0.0186  0.0353+  0.0639* 
    (0.0154)  (0.0200)  (0.0237) 
L2(CAD)    0.0304  0.0611  0.0915 
    (0.0593)  (0.0703)  (0.0717) 
L3(CAD)    -0.0288  -0.0045  -0.0301 
    (0.0306)  (0.0369)  (0.0351) 
L1(DKK)    -0.0532  -0.0384  0.0390 
    (0.0678)  (0.0758)  (0.0901) 
L2(DKK)    -0.0044  0.0078  0.0379 
    (0.0702)  (0.0781)  (0.0940) 
L3(DKK)    0.0274  0.0238  -0.0005 
    (0.0511)  (0.0535)  (0.0595) 
L1(USD)    -0.0414  -0.0518  -0.0411 
    (0.0873)  (0.1120)  (0.0990) 
L2(USD)    -0.0122  0.0129  0.0443 
    (0.1338)  (0.1275)  (0.1396) 
L3(USD)    0.1215*  0.1547*  0.0941 
    (0.0513)  (0.0593)  (0.0666) 
Penalty Law        0.0224 
        (0.0192) 
L1(Penalty Law)        0.0365* 
        (0.0147) 
L2(Penalty Law)        0.0802** 
        (0.0199) 
SEASONALITY  YES  YES  YES  YES 
ORIGIN SPECIFIC COSTS  NO  NO  YES  YES 
         
Constant  0.0114**  -0.0031  -0.0015  0.0032 
  (0.0000)  (0.0101)  (0.0079)  (0.0081) 
Observations  1008  963  963  963 
Adjusted R-squared  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.08
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by each series, are in parentheses. + significant at 10%; 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Variables except dummies are differenced.      
Source: Author's Calculations18
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
  To interpret these estimates, the SG did not resulted in an average increase of prices 
of low-value commodities relative to the same set of commodities in the period when 
SG was not in place. The difference estimate allows for unobserved country-specific cost 
shocks. The exchange rates in general appear to have a weak explanatory power for pork 
products in this sample. In a descriptive industry study, Kaku and Fukase (2002) argue that 
the fluctuation of exchange rates are fully borne by sellers since the convention in the pork 
export to Japan, which adopts the variable levy, is to invoice in yen. While a strong propo-
sition that is supported by the estimates only partially, it is possible that ERPT coefficient 
estimated here might underestimate the degree of TRPT for this reason. Additionally, to 
the extent that the traders adjust abnormal profit earned from evasion, ERPT would be 
attenuated. To be sure, under the assumption of zero TRPT coefficients, the hypothesis 
of tariff evasion is not distinguishable from the alternative hypothesis of a full incomplete 
pass-through of tariff in an empirical strategy solely based on variations in market prices to 
identify evasion. I thus proceed by using the range of previous ERPT estimates discussed 
above. Finally, the strengthening of enforcement seems to have had an impact. The en-
forcement includes prosecutions of larger criminal cases, increased penalty, and nudging 
firms not to evade, and the effects of these different policy tools are combined in the es-
timate. The effects of the nudging may seem controversial given that there seem to be no 
real incentives to act, and indeed, one politician raised concern about its effectiveness.23 
However, warning taxpayers have been shown to affect behaviour in randomised studies 
(Slemrod, Blumenthalb and Christianc, 2001). One may be concerned that the fuel and 
other production costs increased during the mid-2000s might have confounded the influ-
ence of the penalty variables, but the year-country specific dummies should capture those 
confounding effects.
  Table 5 shows the Wald tests that compare the sum of safeguard coefficients to the 
product of the presumed pass-through coefficient and the change in the average declared 
price in log [0.22=ln(681.08-546.53)]. The coefficients used in the tests are based on 
the difference estimate from the full specification (Column 4). In one extreme, under the 
assumption that the full burden of tariff increase is passed onto buyers, we should observe 
a change of 0.22 in log price level. The test rejects the null of no evasion under the full 
pass-through assumption at the 1 per cent level. In the other extreme, if we assume instead 
that a TRPT coefficient to be low, say 12.9 per cent, the lowest estimates of ERPT from the 
studies reviewed above, the sum of the estimates are not distinguishable from an increase 
of 0.066 in log price level, leading us to accept the maintained hypothesis that there was 
no evasion. For a realistic range of TRPT (50-70 per cent), the tests reject the null at the 
5 or 10 levels. The result of the test naturally depends on the presumed parameter value. 
However, for a sensible parameter range, the test rejects the hypothesis that the lack of 19
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price response was due to the pricing behaviour of traders.24
Table 5:The test for the null of no evasion
  Tariff-rate pass-through coefficients (%)  Wald statistic 
  100  9.46  ** 
  80  6.54  * 
  70  5.28  * 
  60  4.30  + 
  50  3.17  + 
  40  2.31   
  0  0.23   
Notes: The results from the Wald tests. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%.    
Source: Author's Calculations
    To check the finding, Figure 4 presents the prices of low-value pork 
parts before and after March 2005, when the last safeguard was removed. The figures 
plot the percentage deviation of average monthly price from the respective group 
average. The series on the pattern after March 2005 (dotted lines) should capture 
seasonal trend. If SG has had any effects we would expect to see a deviation from the 
seasonality in the normal years, especially over August-March. Two lines are nearly 
identical, except for the deviation in January-February and June-July.
Figure 4: Percentage of deviation of monthly prices
Source: Author’s Caculations20
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Other explanations 
Was the attenuation due to hoarding?
The price would not have respond as much if traders were able to stockpile when the tariff 
was low and to sell them off when the tariff was high. While traders incur storage costs 
and forgo interest earnings, frozen pork is physically storable. Figure 5 plots the fraction 
of frozen pork imported to Japan over August-March from JFY1988 through 2007 using 
the Japanese trade statistics. The hoarding behaviour would imply increases in the share of 
imports in April-July so that we would expect to observe reductions in the August-March 
import share over JFY2001–2004. The most salient pattern in the figure is the reduction 
of the share in JFY1996, which is attributable to the invocation of a SSG that increased the 
tariff rate on top of the increased price floor over January through March 1997. The pattern 
suggests that importers adjusted the real timing of import in JFY1996. Over JFY2001-
2004, in contrast, substantial fractions of pork clear custom when tariff is high, indicating 
that SG did not cause shift in timing as much as in JFY1996. Thus, hoarding would not 
have had a first-order effect on the price level of frozen pork during SG in the 2000s.
Figure 5: The share of imports over August-March
Source: Author’s Caculations21
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Was the attenuation due to tax avoidance?
Another alternative explanation for the lack of price response to safeguards is the tax avoidance 
through the mixing of parts. By increasing the average price on invoice through increasing 
the share of high-value meats, importers can avoid paying penalising tariff applicable to 
pork imported at prices below the gate price. While this strategy increases costs to traders 
due to the purchase of high-value parts that would not have been imported otherwise, the 
full burden of the safeguard would not be borne by market participants.
  Figure 6 plots the value of frozen pork per kilo exported to Japan declared at the 
Denmark custom (solid line). If there was a change in the composition of pork parts ex-
ported from Denmark, the average value should increase, perhaps with a lead. The data is 
based on frozen pork category that corresponds to the Japanese custom data. The dotted 
line shows the frozen pork parts imported from Denmark reported to the Japanese custom. 
Put differently, the figure presents a time series examination of the price gap in the context 
of frozen port import into Japan to be discussed below.
  For 2001-2004, the volatility of the value declared at Denmark appears to increase, 
perhaps reflecting some adjustments in the timing of trade. However, there seems no 
significant indication that the mixing strategy was in wide use. Tanaka and Mori (2001) 
find the mixing strategy to be significant but their study is based on chilled US products in 
1998–2000. It is thus unlikely that the mixing strategy explain the lack of price response 
in the 2000s for the Denmark frozen pork.
Figure 6: The price gap analysis
Source: Author’s Caculations22
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Alternative approach: Price-gap estimate of evaded duties
The most salient feature of Figure 6 is the gap between prices over 1999–2005. Two lines 
are reasonably close in other periods; the 1996 safeguard is associated with a sharp tem-
porary rise in the average value declared at Denmark, indicating that much of the imports 
for the period employed the tax avoidance strategy — a pattern that is in line with the 
sharp reduction in the imported volume during SG and SSG noted above. In contrast, 
from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, the declared values at Denmark are visibly below 
those declared at Japan. The behaviour of price gaps is thus consistent with the lack of 
price response to SG documented above.
  The broad pattern is in line with the market development. As the share of import 
in the domestic pork consumption increased during the 1990s, the detection probability 
would have fallen, all else equal. A larger market size would be conducive to evasion since 
the evasion production function is likely to exhibit economies of scale; court cases have 
documented elaborate evasion schemes that involve establishments of shell companies, 
indicating that firms need to invest in learning evasion strategy.25 The closing of the price 
gap starting in 2005 can be explained by the strengthening of law enforcement. Recall 
from the above analysis that the price of low-value parts increased at the time that the 
enforcement was strengthened. Compliance to the tariff regime would have resulted in 
traders resorting to the mixing strategy, which increases costs of imports.
  Table 6 shows the price-gap estimate of evaded custom duties on the Japanese 
import of Denmark frozen pork parts. The price gap is defined as the difference between 
the CIF (per kilo) declared at the Japanese custom and the one-month lag of FOB (per 
kilo) declared at the Denmark custom. The lag of one month is chosen because shipping 
from Copenhagen to Yokohama takes 36 days.26 The Danish Krone in the Denmark data 
is converted to Yen using spot exchange rates. The evasion estimate is the product of the 
price gap and corresponding volume declared at the Japanese custom. The estimate is 
intended to provide an upper bound estimate only: once again, the sources of discrepancy 
include the costs of transportation (fright, insurance, other expenses), the difference in the 
timing of import and export, actual exchange rate used by trading parties, and commodi-
ties damaged during transport. However, since those sources of disparities are unlikely to 
change abruptly, the price gap estimates would provide a reasonable comparison across 
time.23
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Table 6: Revenue and Evasion: Denmark Frozen Pork
  Evasion Estimate    Revenue    Evasion-Revenue Ratio   
JFY  All year  Safeguard  All year  Safeguard  All year  Safeguard 
  Apr.-Mar.  Aug.-Mar.  Apr.-Mar.  Aug.-Mar. Apr.-Mar. Aug.-Mar.
1998  9,006.0  -  3,598.4  -  2.50  - 
1999  34,134.5  -  4,946.0  -  6.90  - 
2000  29,849.1  -  4,417.1  -  6.76  - 
2001  40,668.1  31,357.3  5,677.1  3,727.2  7.16  8.41 
2002  46,078.6  34,496.8  5,674.9  3,463.0  8.12  9.96 
2003  47,623.3  35,752.5  5,945.6  3,520.2  8.01  10.16 
2004  53,161.3  32,700.8  6,647.7  3,424.8  8.00  9.55 
2005  24,837.4  -  5,297.9  -  4.69  - 
2006  6,853.7  -  3,898.7  -  1.76  - 
2007  834.3  -  2,709.8  -  0.31  - 
Total  293,046.3  134,307.4  48,812.9  14,135.2  6.00  9.50
Notes: The unit is in million yen.            
Source: Author's Calculations
 
  Over the decade spanning JFY1998–2007, the upper-bound estimate of total eva-
sion on Denmark frozen pork is 293 billion yen. The amount is 6 times as large as the 
total tariff revenue on the commodity from Denmark. The evasion-revenue ratio shows 
a substantial time variation, peaking at 8.12 in 2002, and falling to 0.31 in 2007. This 
pattern suggests an evasion epidemic over 1999–2005, followed by a period of better 
compliance. The ratio during the safeguard in JFY2001–04 is higher because of the larger 
amount of tariff evaded per kilo due to the higher price floor. A higher evasion-revenue 
ratio during the safeguard period indicates that the tariff revenue from Denmark pork did 
not respond as much to the increase in tariff due to evasion. In sum, this auxiliary evidence 
supports the interpretation that the price disparity as due to tariff evasion rather than the 
adjustment of profit margins. Further, evidence supports the interpretation that the break 
in cointegrating relationship between Denmark frozen belly and tenderloin as due to the 
better compliance to the variable tariff levy.
Concluding remarks
This paper examined the disparities between the observed prices of low-value imported 
pork parts and the predicted prices that would have prevailed under the full compliance 
to the increases in a price floor under the Japanese variable levy on pork. Statistically 
significant disparities between prices were found during the safeguard tariff of JFY2001-
2004, and were best explained by tariff evasion. A complementary examination based on 
a comparison of trade statistics from Japan and Denmark — the leading exporter of frozen 24
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pork to Japan — revealed visible gaps over JFY1999–2005, indicating an epidemic of un-
der-invoicing to reduce tax liability. Alternative explanations for the lack of price response 
were considered but were unlikely to account for the divergence of market prices from the 
theoretical benchmark. The results indicated that the strengthening of enforcement have 
had a statistically significant impact on price. I estimated the total amount of tariff evaded 
on Denmark frozen pork to be 293 billion yen over 1998-2007. This amount was 6 times 
as much as the revenue collected from those commodities in the period.
  The analysis has implications beyond the current context. First, in line with Cooper 
(1974) and Pitt (1981a,b), this study shows that price disparities give indications about the 
presence of pervasive tax evasion. Particularly, a comparison of two similar commodities 
that are reasonably thought of as differentially affected by non-compliance would provide 
a quick visual check. Second, the results raise questions about the effectiveness of safe-
guard tariffs as a public policy tool. Safeguard tariffs affect the margins of incentives that 
are neglected in the partial equilibrium analysis of a commodity tax. A tax hike increases 
the incentives for misreporting (Fisman and Wei, 2005), and I find a near complete at-
tenuation of safeguard tariff in the current setting. Thus, to achieve its protectionist goal, 
safeguard tariffs should be accompanied by a closer monitoring by Customs. However, 
policy makers should be aware that such efforts draw resource away from the monitoring 
of other imported commodities or even border protection when the custom resource is 
fixed.
  Several extensions to this paper are possible. First, it would be of interest to examine 
price disparities in countries that rely more heavily on tariff as a revenue source. Particu-
larly, it seem a useful exercise to see whether price disparities exist for commodities that 
are found to have price gaps in China, India and Eastern Europe (Fisman and Wei 2005; 
Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova, 2008; Javorcik and Narciso, 2008). Conversely, 
studies have suggested the lack of price response to the US steel safeguard of 2002 (Lieb-
man, 2006). The pattern might have been caused by exemptions granted to a number of 
source countries, but since the press reports widespread smuggling in US steel imports,27 
an interesting question would be: Are there price gaps for the steel imports into the United 
States? Last, given the goal of protecting Japanese pork producers, a further study might 
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Data Appendix
Trade Statistics of Japan
The monthly information for the declared pork parts imports are obtained from the Trade 
Statistics of Japan published by the Ministry of Finance (http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/
info/index.htm). The Harmonised System codes for the frozen meat of pork are 020329021 and 
020329022 and correspond to other pork meats, which exclude dressed carcasses and hams, 
shoulders and cuts thereof, with bone in. 
Denmark customs data
The monthly Denmark custom data is obtained from the StatBank of the Statistics Denmark.
(http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1024).
I combined 11 categories of pork meats that begin with Frozen. In practice, nearly all of frozen 
meat is reported under the category Frozen boneless meat of domestic pork (excluding bellies 
streaky and cuts thereof). 
Exchange rates
Monthly exchange rates are obtained from International Financial Statistics published by the 
International Monetary Fund.
Notes
1  For a collection of precursors of the contemporary research on tariff evasion, see Bhagwati (1974).
2   The extensive literature on the exchange rate pass-through indicates that there are substantial 
departures from the perfect competition in some of the international markets and that the degree to 
which the change in exchange rate is passed through to the price in the destination market is affected 
by the pricing power of the exporter (Feenstra, 1995). The approach would be sensible when the 
market is approximated by a long-run equilibrium with a constant marginal cost and free entry. See 
also the discussion by Besley and Rosen (1999).
3   In these studies, different types of behavioural responses are expected to weaken the response of 
some variables to taxes. To identify the behavioural response, the estimate of the tax effects are 
compared with a benchmark for which the magnitudes are theoretically equivalent in the absence of 
the particular behavioural response. To identify the impact of tax salience, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 
(2007) compare the responses of beer demand to exercise tax (salient tax) and sales tax (less salient). 
To identify the effects of tax evasion, Marion and Muehlegger (2008) compare tax and (wholesale) 
price elasticity of diesel fuel retail demand.
4   The figure includes measures in form of tariffs or quantitative restrictions, and is based on 
notification by WTO members to the WTO -  (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/safeg_e/
safeg_e.htm#statistics, accessed September 2, 2009). The Japanese safeguard has some distinct 
features since it is permitted under a separate agreement (see Obara, Dyck and Stout, 2003).
5   In 1990, the import and domestic production of pork was 342 thousand tons and 1,088 thousand 
tons respectively. In 2007, the import and domestic production of pork was 879 thousand tons and 
869 thousand tons respectively.28
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6   See, for example, the Editorial in the International Herald Tribune, November 17, 2006.
7   The Japanese pork industry was politically active in the mid-2000s. The domestic swinery formed 
the Japan Pork Producers’ Association in 2006. The pork importers formed in 2006 a NPO that 
lobby for a pork tariff reform.
8  To my knowledge, Tanaka and Mori (2001) is the only empirical study on the variable levy, focusing 
on the tax avoidance through mixing strategy to be discussed below. In a book published by an 
interest group that calls for a pork tariff reform, a simple price disparity analysis has been considered 
(The Forum for Considering Import & Distribution System of Meat, 2007).
9   A response by the head of the Agricultural Production Bureau in the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishery at the Diet Committee Meeting on Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, August 
4, 2005. Translation by this author.
10   A large number of previous studies examine tax avoidance by multinational corporations (for 
example Gordon and Hines, 2002) and evasion by individuals (for example Andreoni, Erard, and 
Feinstein, 1998), but a relatively smaller number of studies concern outright evasion by firms.
11   For a nice discussion on the importance of behavioural response in the context of elasticity of 
income to taxes, see Gordon and Slemrod (2000).
12   Kaku and Fukase (2002) provide a descriptive study on the swine markets in Japan. Obara, Dyck, 
and Stout (2003) describe the Japanese government policies on swine.
13   The strategy is permitted according to a Japanese tax official contacted by this author.
14  From January 1995 to November 2008, 89 safeguards were imposed around the world (http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_e.htm#top, accessed May 11, 2009).
15   Based on a headline search of financial press (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun). The 
largest evasion is 10.48 billion yen in the late 2006.
16  For a centralised data source, see Agriculture & Livestock Industries Corporation (http://lin.lin.
go.jp/alic/statis/dome/data2/e_nstatis.htm, Accessed May 12, 2009).
17  Meat processing companies are likely to have a stronger bargaining power over trading intermediaries 
owning to the concentration in the downstream industry. Thus, contract prices in the over-the-
counter trade are likely to reveal the effects of evasion since the benefits of tax saving through 
evasion would be passed onto buyers.
18   von Cramon-Taubadel (1997) examines wholesale and retail prices of pork in Germany using a co-
integration regression.
19   Dicky-Fuller unit root tests on the logarithmic of average price in a specification with time trends 
reject the unit root hypothesis at the 5 per cent level in only 1 out of 37 instances. I therefore 
accept the null hypothesis of the log price being nonstationary, but, as in Campa and Goldberg 
(2005), with caution about the power of the test. The Engle-Granger test rejected the null of no 
cointegration of the prices of belly and tenderloin, so I take the two series to be co-integrated, once 
again with caution.
20   If profit earned by trading intermediaries are affected by SG, their stock prices should be influenced 
by a surprise invocation of SG. A direct approach to check whether the importers adjust margin 
would be to examine the response of stock prices, but to my knowledge, no specialized trader of 
pork is publicly listed in the Japanese stock market.
21   In addition, Rezitis and Brown (1999) examine Greek tobacco export to the United States, and 
their estimates imply symmetry.
22   Another explanation is the inflow of high-value meat through the mixing strategy. While the 
explanation is consistent with the depressed price in the intermission of SG, it would not account for 
the rise in January-March. As discussed below, the mixing strategy would not have been prevalent in 
the sample period.
23   A statement by Chizuko Takahashi (Japanese Communist Party) at the Diet Committee Meeting on 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, May 17, 2005.
24   I have tried nesting the null of no evasion into the cointegration analysis with a structural break. The 
test is based on a comparison of the implied change in the tenderloin price implied by the estimate 29
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of cointegrating vector with the expected price change based on a range of TRPT coefficients. The 
implied change is evaluated at the mean of belly price. The results are hard to interpret since the 
power of the test is likely to be low due to the imprecise estimates arising from a shorter time series 
(2001:2-2005:3).
25   A ruling on an evasion case at the Tokyo District Court made in December 22, 2005 found that the 
case involved ordering forged invoice from a company in Taiwan, clearing customs under the name 
of a shell company, and changing ownership through a number of shell companies.
26   Based on the shipping schedule posted on the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s website (accessed Dec. 1, 
2008).
27   The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), Nov. 1, 2001.30
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